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I. Introduction: Public Choice and Environmental Policy

This chapter reviews the contributions that public choice research and scholarship
have made to our understanding of the decisions of governments responding to
environmental issues. The literature examined concentrates on domestic policy making
within the United States, although occasional reference is made to the growing literature
that studies European and international decision making. Much of this literature is
theoretical, while a growing portion of it is descriptive. At the same time, public choice
analyses are routinely invoked in discussions about the appropriate role of government in
addressing environmental problems, where the implications of this literature takes on
normative implications as well. This chapter considers the theoretical, the descriptive
and the normative dimensions of the literature.
A portion of the public choice literature, especially some of its influential early
work, depicts government as a system in which all participants ignore welfare-improving
actions in favor of ones that advance their own narrow self-interests, and where
participants representing economically powerful special interests predominate. The
results are government decisions that routinely benefit industry and concentrated wealth
at the expense of broad citizen concerns about environmental quality. The normative
implication seems clear: Anyone concerned with the public interest or simply opposed to
being victimized by the self-interested motives of someone else ought to avoid putting
important environmental decisions in the hands of such a system, if possible.
More recent work has exposed several flaws in this descriptive account. One
constant throughout the literature insists on examining “politics without romance,” by
maintaining the hypothesis that public officials do not someone magically abandon their
own interests upon assuming their public responsibilities in order to embrace an entirely
public-minded agenda. Even so, research now strongly suggests that -- while self-interest
remains a powerful presence in politics -- public officials also act on their own
convictions, including their convictions about the public good, and their decisions can
reflect broad-based public interests as well as narrow, concentrated economic interests.
A further refinement, which partially explains this more nuanced view of elected
officials, comes from studies showing that broad-based interests are sometimes capable
of effectively projecting their interests into the public arena, a possibility that the early
public choice literature discounted too quickly. These refinements have several
important payoffs. As a descriptive matter, models that account for the influence of
broad-based interests as well as for the tendency of public officials to respond to mixed
motives do a better job predicting the outcomes of government decisions than those that
do not (Farber & Frickey 1991, p. 33), and hence form a sounder basis for normative
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discussions of government performance. (Jim Rossi describes a similar trajectory and
makes similar observations about improved descriptive accuracy in his chapter on energy
regulation and deregulation, this volume.) Furthermore, public choice has always claimed
a methodological commonality with neoclassical microeconomics and its study of
markets, yet the models upon which the bleak picture of government have been based
were methodologically incompatible with market theory. Some of the most important
methodological inconsistencies are corrected by these refinements. Finally, the
normative implications of these improved descriptive accounts change.
****
Public choice research has had a long engagement with environmental issues. In
a sense, the two grew up together. The modern environmental era in the United States
was launched in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with Congress first enacting an
impressive number of important environmental statutes and then the Environmental
Protection Agency and other federal agencies promulgating extensive regulations to
implement those statutes. In just this same time frame, seminal works in public choice’s
study of legislation and regulation were being published, such as Mancur Olson’s The
Logic of Collective Action (1965) and George Stigler’s “The Theory of Economic
Regulation” (1971). These early works focused on the then-dominant forms of federal
economic regulation, but soon a large public choice literature developed applying the
ideas of these early works to the expanding world of environmental regulation.
Even before public choice engaged with environmental issues, its intellectual
predecessor, microeconomics, had already done so, but for very different reasons.
Microeconomics’ axiomatic account of how ideally functioning markets can produce a
social maximum naturally invites inquiry into whether actual markets conform to the
conditions necessary to achieve such a maximum. One of the necessary conditions is the
absence of externalities of the sort that environmental problems typically exemplify. It
was thus nearly inevitable that microeconomics’ study of market failure would generate
recommendations specifically aimed at improving market performance in the presence of
environmental externalities, eventually producing a tool kit that includes pollution taxes,
fee systems, marketable permits, and expansion of private ownership as means to
improve the performance of markets in the face of such externalities.
Because the idea of a society getting the most it can out of the use of scarce
resources is normatively attractive, advocates of measures like these frequently appealed
to public decision makers to adopt them. More often than not, these recommendations
did not receive warm receptions, as legislatures and agencies pursued quite different
approaches to regulating the environment. Public choice enters the story at this point,
offering to explain why the recommendations of its market theory colleagues are so
frequently ignored. Unlike microeconomics, however, public choice did not first develop
an axiomatic account of the ideal conditions that would produce socially optimal
government decisions and then ask how the conditions under which actual governments
operate may cause governments to fall short of the ideal. Arrow’s impossibility theorem
taught that it was impossible to identify socially attractive conditions within which any
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decision making mechanism could simply aggregate individual public preferences based
on votes, analogous to the way in which markets can aggregate individual private
preferences based on willingness to pay. Instead, public choice approached government
by taking the individual behavioral assumptions that microeconomics uses in market
settings, applying them to public decision makers, and seeking to understand what kinds
of decisions would result. The prediction that emerged was that such government
decision makers would systematically exploit their government positions for their own
gain – just as market actors are assumed to do – but that the government setting lacked a
comparable invisible hand to produce socially desirable outcomes from these privately
motivated actions.
So, unlike microeconomics’ treatment of markets, public choice
lacks any general account of the conditions that could theoretically produce such
normatively attractive results, and it does not generally generate recommendations for
how government decision making can be improved. Instead, it offers accounts of
government failure, predicting that government decisions will deviate from the socially
optimal because the decisions will be dominated by narrow, well-endowed interests that
are best equipped to advance the self-interest of government decision makers. Its take
away message from these predictions echoes the conclusion of President Reagan in his
first inaugural address: “government is not the solution to our problems, government is
the problem.”
That normative message obviously depends upon the reliability of the descriptive
account. If government does not in fact respond to problems as public choice models
predict, there is less reason to endorse recommendations that are based on those very
predictions. Environmental problems and the numerous programs that governments have
enacted and implemented in reaction to them provide a fertile proving ground for public
choice’s descriptive account, and hence also for refining its normative message.
The following two sections elaborate upon how the connection between the study
of market failure and the study of government failure has evolved. Early public choice
theorists observed that governments frequently failed to follow the advice of market
theorists in their responses to correcting for environmental externalities, and offered a
theory of government failure as an explanation. After tracing this relationship in Sections
II and III, Sections IV identifies two ways in which the earliest descriptions offered by
public choice were actually inconsistent with its own professed methodology. When
these theoretical flaws are corrected, public choice’s descriptive models improve.
Sections IV and V review the literature regarding four significant questions common to
much environmental policy making, illustrating the evolution of public choice
contributions to our understanding of environmental policy making. The final section
offers suggestions for further research.
II. Markets, Market Failure and the Environment
Microeconomics grounds market theory on a parsimonious set of assumptions. It
assumes that individuals are rational in that they have a coherent set of preferences. This
starting point only concerns the structure of individual preferences and assumes nothing
about the content of those preferences. Regarding what people actually prefer, the
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guiding principle is de gustibus non est disputandum – there is no questioning someone’s
tastes. As for how preferences are structured, “coherence” assumes that individuals can
rank order their preferences in a way that avoids inconsistencies such preferring A to B,
B to C and then also C to A. Beyond these assumptions regarding preferences,
individuals are also assumed to pursue those preferences by making strategic decisions:
they survey the group of choices available to them and then select the one that promises
the highest ranked package of preferences. Finally, if welfare is represented as
preference-satisfaction, market theory demonstrates that if individuals for whom these
assumptions are true exchange goods and services with each other through private
exchanges that themselves must satisfy some necessary conditions, the resulting
allocation of goods and services within the society as a whole will achieve a social
welfare maximum, as measured by willingness to pay. It is a social maximum because
any further adjustment in goods and services, such as by regulation, would leave
someone with a lower ranked group of preferences than she held prior to the adjustment,
without benefiting anyone else sufficiently so that the beneficiary would be willing to pay
the loser enough to induce a voluntary exchange between the two. If someone had been
willing to make such a payment, the exchange would have already occurred.
The price mechanisms of the market produce this result. Prices are bid up until
buyers are not willing to pay a higher price because the good does not bring sufficient
benefit to be worth paying more, and sellers will not drop the price to attract more buyers
because the money they would get from the purchase is not sufficient to offset to costs
they incur in providing the good to the buyer. Prices therefore settle at the point where
marginal benefits equal marginal costs. With marginal benefits and costs equal, anyone
who does not have a good is someone whose marginal benefit from attaining it (again,
registered by willingness to pay) is not great enough to offset the marginal cost incurred
by taking it from someone who currently has it. This implies that any transfers that are
made outside the market structure will reduce social welfare and that market transactions
have achieved a social welfare maximum.
Societies have goals other than allocative efficiency, including equitable or
distributional goals; these goals might be served by constraining or regulating markets.
Even so, market theorists often insist that constraining or regulating markets to advance
such other goals is generally an inferior means of advancing those other values, because
such interventions impair the market’s resource allocation capabilities, shrinking the total
welfare pie. Better, in their view, that society should achieve other objectives through
measures like monetary transfer programs that do not directly interfere in markets.
Market regulation ought to be restricted to cases in which existing markets fall short of
achieving efficient allocations, and then its objective ought to be primarily directed at
corrections that will improve the allocative performance of those actual markets.
Here is where market theory engages environmental policy. One of the
conditions that ideal markets must satisfy in order to allocate resources optimally is that
private exchanges must not generate appreciable costs or benefits that the parties to the
exchange fail to take into account.
If such costs or benefits external to market
transactions do exist, then the prices established by the market will not be set at the place
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where marginal benefits equal marginal costs. When the transaction generates external
benefits, the goal of maximizing social welfare would argue for more of the goods to be
produced, because the functioning market will fail to incorporate some existing additional
willingness to pay that would give sellers an incentive to produce more than they actually
have. Conversely, when the transaction generates external costs, markets will
overproduce, because some costs that would have reduced supply have been left out of
account. In either case, markets will fail to maximize society’s welfare, as represented by
willingness to pay.
Economics textbooks often illustrate the problem of externalities with
environmental examples. They are easy to grasp, involve familiar situations and attract
student interest. For example, suppose the process that a paper company uses to
manufacture paper generates pollution that flows into the neighboring river, killing fish
downstream, which the population downstream would otherwise eat.
If the paper
company had to purchase fish from those downstream fish eaters, just as it must purchase
the raw materials that it uses in producing its products, the company’s costs and
consequently its prices would rise and less paper – and less pollution -- would be
produced. But because the fish eaters’ costs are externalities, the price of paper is set too
low and too much paper and pollution are produced.
Economists have long appreciated the problem of externalities and have
developed a number of ideas about how to address the problem. When A. C. Pigou
analyzed the problem of externalities, he saw a role for government to intervene in a
positive way. “It is possible,” he wrote, “for the State, if it so chooses, to remove the
divergence in any field by ‘extraordinary encouragements’ or ‘extraordinary restraints’
upon investment in field.” (Pigou 1920, p. 192). To address the problems created by the
paper manufacturer, Pigou preferred a tax equal to the external costs to the fish eaters.
With that tax in place, the price that the manufacturer agreed to in selling its product
would have to be able to defray the costs that were formerly external to the transactions.
Internalizing the externalities in this way would once again permit the price mechanism
to set marginal benefits equal to total marginal costs, correcting the resource
misallocation that the externality otherwise created.
Methods other than a tax could also be employed to approximate the results of
fully internalized costs. A certain amount of pollution could simply be prohibited by the
state, either plant-by-plant or in the form of a cap-and-trade program applicable to
numerous sources, or particular technological methods of controlling pollution could be
mandated. Provided that these techniques ended up with approximately the result that
market transactions with fully internalized costs would achieve, the result would improve
the existing situation in terms of allocational efficiency. Of these options, economists
have generally preferred the approach of imposing a Piguovian tax to internalize the
externalities. Even when policies other than such a tax are being advocated, the
underlying externality/market failure diagnosis of environmental problems has proven
powerful as a powerful justification for government intervention because the diagnosis is
widely taken to be reliable and improving allocational efficiency – increasing the size of
the pie – is taken to be desirable, ceteris paribus. The market and externality-based
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analysis of environmental problems has been thoroughly developed in numerous works
including The Theory of Environmental Policy, Baumol and Oates (1975) and Markets
and the Environment, Keohane and Olmstead (2007).
III. Government Choices, Government Failure and the Environment
Notwithstanding the cogency of the externality/market failure diagnosis and the
logic behind recommendations to improve market functioning, when market theorists
took their ideas into the public arena, they often came away disappointed. Government
frequently failed to follow their advice. Public choice theory now enters the scene,
bringing a message of explanation to their market theory colleagues. For public choice
theorists, their colleagues’ disappointment bordered on the naïve, because it indicated
that the market theorists were “largely assum[ing] that political actors are mainly
concerned with the public interest.” (Tullock, Seldon and Brady 2002, p.4) While it is
doubtful that many people who have actually had experience trying to persuade elected
officials to act have ever been quite that naïve, taking the time to advocate a socialwelfare improving government policy does seem to require a belief that public officials
place some value on the public interest, that they will listen to arguments based on the
public interest and that they will respond positively to them some of the time. Otherwise,
why make the effort?
Some public choice theorists met even this more modest version of “public
interest” theory with skepticism, however. In fact, they thought that any market theorist
who approached government with this frame of mind was guilty of a certain
inconsistency. When thinking about human behavior in the market context, market
theory assumes human beings to be rational and motivated to maximize his or her own
welfare. Those assumptions are in principle completely generalizable, seemingly having
nothing to do with the immediate market setting in which the individual is making
choices. To the public choice theorist, market theorists’ “public interest” expectation for
government behavior implicitly relies upon a bifurcated view of human behavior, in
which assumptions about human motivations mysteriously change when the institutional
setting changes from the market to the public arena. This more complicated view ought
to require some justification. Until the advocates of the public interest theory of
government have carried the burden of proof on the issue of why basic assumptions
concerning human behavior should be complicated in this way, public choice theorists
argued that the rational welfare maximizing assumptions ought to be maintained
throughout, whether public or private decisions were being made. (Buchanan 1984, p. 1314) Public choice proceeded to develop a theory of government performance based on
applying these universal assumptions to public as well as private decision making.
Where “Pigou saw government as an environmental manager, a benevolent agent
unaffected by special interest demand for government favors,” public choice saw
government officials as self-interested. (Yandle 1999, p. 8).
Not content to defend this position simply by shifting the burden of proof to the
other side, public choice theorists also set out to verify that actual government
performance could be explained better if one assumed that the behavioral assumptions
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that worked so well in market settings did indeed extend to public decision making
settings as well. Their general claim soon generated a research program that constructed
models of government and then sought to verify them. To give its work some interesting
flavor, the public choice literature was also salted with numerous anecdotal illustrations
of its basic thesis. For instance, Milton Friedman, whose most famous work sought to
change the way in which the Federal Reserve managed the money supply, put public
choice’s core diagnosis in the following way:
“Only recently have I come to the conclusion that the Federal
Reserve System’s imperviousness to my technical advice reflects
neither the wrongness of the advice nor the ignorance of the powers
that be, but rather the simple fact that the self-interest of those
powers and of the Federal Reserve System would not have been
served by adopting that advice. Could a System that had restricted
itself to maintaining a steady and moderate rate of growth in the
quantity of money conceivably have acquired the prestige and
influence that the System now has? Would the head of a system that
had limited itself to that modest and feasible task be regarded in poll
after poll as the second most powerful person in the land?”
(Friedman 1985, p. 18)
Earlier, George Stigler had offered a similar diagnosis. Remarking on how
economists regularly criticized regulatory agencies such as the ICC for failing to adopt
measures consistent with maximizing social welfare, Stigler wrote that “this criticism
seems to me exactly as appropriate as a criticism of the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Company for selling groceries, or as a criticism of a politician for currying popular
support.” Arguments and persuasion based on the public interest are ineffective in such
settings. “The fundamental vice of such criticism is that it misdirects attention: it
suggests that the way to get an ICC which is not subservient to the carriers is to preach to
the commissioners or to the people who appoint the commissioners. The only way to get
a different commission would be to change the political support of the commission, and
reward commissioners on a basis unrelated to their services to the carriers.” (Stigler 1971,
p. 16)
In and of themselves, the criticisms that public choice leveled at the behavior of
government were not new; when Stigler wrote, capture theory was an established school
of thought within political science. Traditional capture theory, however, relied heavily
upon close historical observation of prior agency behavior. (E.g., Bernstein 1955). Public
choice instead sought to systematize the study of government. By postulating that the
actions of governments can be explained and anticipated through an analysis that
presumes that public officials are rational self-interested maximizers, public choice
defines “a program of scientific endeavor that expose[s] government failure.” (Rowley
1993, Vol. I, p. xiv). Anecdotal accounts such as Friedman’s and Stigler’s can provide
color for public choice’s criticism of government but as a research program public choice
theory aspires on systematic theoretical elaboration and testing.
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Mancur Olson The Logic of Collective Action (1965) informs many of the public
choice models of government action, and raises an issue that is crucially important for the
analysis of environmental decision making. Olson applied rational actor, welfaremaximizing assumptions to one of the basic building blocks of politics, interest groups.
Olson reasoned that the presumption of political theories of pluralism that interest groups
somehow just formed around a shared concern was an inadequate explanation for why
individuals would engage in costly behavior that might bestow large group benefits, but
small individual benefits. By failing to analyze the problem from the perspective of a
rational, welfare-maximizing individual, this approach to group formation commits the
same error as the “public interest” theory about elected officials. When Olson corrected
the error by analyzing the individual costs and benefits that rational individuals confront
in deciding whether to act collectively or not, he predicted that groups would be hard to
organize when the group activity promised to produce benefits that were spread out
among beneficiaries in amounts that are small for each beneficiary. In the case of such
broad-based groups, each individual would see that her contribution to the group effort
had little chance to affect her own personal fortunes -- either others would contribute
enough so that she could free-ride on their efforts or others would not contribute and the
minimal amount she was willing to contribute would not put the effort over the top. In
either case, no benefits to her would be produced by her contribution, and hence it would
be irrational to join in the group effort. In contrast, smaller groups containing members
who stand to gain more concentrated benefits would be better able to organize, either
because a single member would have enough at stake to underwrite much of the effort
individually, or because some subgroup would be small enough to overcome the
transactions costs associated with reaching an agreement to pool sufficient resources to
produce the benefit. Compared to broad-based groups, concentrated groups thus enjoy a
comparative advantage with respect to their ability to organize to advance group interests
compared to groups facing diffuse, individually small benefits.
Using Olson’s insights, Stigler argued that the regulation he observed was the
logical result of the domination by the industry being regulated, a concentrated group
compared to the diffuse group of consumers who might have desired welfare-improving
regulation. For Stigler, “regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and
operated primarily for its benefit.” (Stigler 1971, p.3) Unlike Bernstein’s earlier thesis
that regulatory capture developed as regulatory agencies matured, Stigler’s theory
suggests that industry interests dominate regulatory design from its very conception in the
legislature, a view consistent with revisionist histories of the ICC by Kolko (1965) and
MacAvoy (1965), whose examination of the early regulatory history of the ICC led them
to conclude that the ICC was created to shore up a railroad cartel that was operating
privately with only moderate success.
Stigler’s rudimentary model of interest groups and regulatory agencies has been
improved upon significantly, but even its primitive form embodies the distinctiveness of
the public choice approach. While other students of regulation had observed the fact that
regulatory decisions frequently fell short when judged against a market-correction ideal,
students of public choice claim that they can provide a systematic explanation of why
they do -- an explanation based on a generally applicable theory of government. The key
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to the theory is that because individuals are rational and strategic, they will react in
predictable ways to the choices they face: they will make the choice that maximizes their
own welfare. If this is no less true in the context of political institutions than in the
market, and if the sequence of choices that must be made in order to produce a political
result, along with the incentives and costs presented at each choice, can be identified and
modeled, political outcomes can in principle be systematically characterized and
predicted. Developing adequate models of the political process has proven challenging,
but so long as modeling disagreements occur within a conceptual framework that
encompasses the rational actor assumption, they fit within the public choice paradigm.
The predictions about government performance that flow from Stigler’s and
similar models are systematically “grim” and “pessimistic” about the ability of
government action to improve overall social welfare. In these models, government
choices are effectively dominated by concentrated economic interests who are better able
to reward government officials. (Mashaw 1997, p. 21; Eskridge 1988, p. 288; Krueger
1974). In that environment, the decision public officials make will enable concentrated
interests to gain advantages that they could not achieve even in flawed markets. Overall,
the effect of public choice’s diagnosis of government failure “is to encourage cynicism
about governmental institutions, and to promote hostility toward any invocation of the
coercive powers of the state.” (Merrill 1997, p. 1070)
IV. Developments in Public Choice Research about Environmental Politics
Environmental externalities are generated by phenomena that vary in their
chemical, biological or physical composition, in their spatial distribution, in how long
their effects endure, in the harms they cause, in the methods through which they can be
mitigated or remediated, and in how costly it is to mitigate or remedy them. Government
responses to them also vary, in part due to the differences in these characteristics, and in
part due to the characteristics of the political environment in which the problems are
addressed. Whatever the specific government responses are, they typically must face up
to four basic questions: (1) whether or not government action is warranted; (2) if it is, the
scope and stringency of the government action, including the manner in which a
bureaucracy will implement and enforce any statutory standards; (3) the level of
government that will assume responsibility; and (4) the type of regulation, or regulatory
instrument, that will be employed. A considerable public choice literature examines each
of these questions. The last two issues are the subject of the section following this one.
This section takes up the first two. In the course of doing so, it traces two refinements in
public choice theory: incorporating a more accurate understanding of the possibility for
broad-based collective action, and acknowledging a broader and more realistic range for
the preferences of public officials.
The earliest public choice models were also vulnerable to a number of ancillary
criticisms besides those that led to these refinements. The models often treated
governments as monolithic rather than structurally complex. Relatedly, many early
models were entirely demand-side models – examining the nature of the demand for
regulation from concentrated interests – virtually ignoring the supply side – the political
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process through which regulation is produced. (Keohane, Revesz and Stavins 1997, pp.
4-5) Both of these limitations diminished the usefulness and reliability of the models.
Many analysts also did not simply accept the rational actor assumption uncritically.
Challenges to that assumption are, however, outside the scope of this chapter, which
focuses on developments within the public choice paradigm itself. Here, the issue has not
been whether rational actor models are appropriate ones for the analysis of government
decisions, but rather whether or not rational actor assumptions are being properly defined
and applied. In two significant respects, the most pessimistic predictions of government
performance turn out to be based on work that fails to remain faithful to those underlying
assumptions. The following two subsections examine how more recent scholarship has
been correcting for these errors.
A. Collective Environmental Action
In the models that predict the most grim or pessimistic results from government
action to protect the environment, concentrated economic interests effectively dominate.
While some regulatory contexts do exhibit this kind of narrow interest group domination,
to predict that this will always or routinely be so when government addresses
environmental problems misinterprets Olson’s collective action logic. That logic does
not suggest that large diffuse groups can never effectively organize so as to counteract the
influence of concentrated special interests. His argument was only that, in light of the
costs of collective action, in situations where the incentives that accrue directly from such
action are small, such groups face additional obstacles compared to smaller groups in
which each member has a greater stake in the outcome. These conditions do not
accurately describe every situation in which environmental policy is being determined,
and when different conditions are present, large groups can organize effectively. Indeed,
Olson’s Logic of Collective Action contains an entire chapter exploring how large groups
use incentives other than individual material benefits in order to produce collective
action. Far from thinking such action to be impossible, Olson argued that further study
was necessary to understand from a public choice perspective how collective action by
broad-based groups succeeded. A growing literature examines how diffuse groups
overcome their disadvantages to succeed in organizing in different areas, including
environmental advocacy. (Chong 1991, Everett & Peirce 1992, Lubell 2002, Lubell et al.
2006)
The organizational difficulty facing collective action is structurally the same as
the multi-person prisoners’ dilemma often present in common pool resources problems.
Consistently with the models that routinely predict agency capture, Hardin’s “tragedy of
the commons” suggested that all such situations lead to overuse because that is where a
rational actor would see his individual self-interest to be best advanced. (Hardin 1968).
Once again, however, research such as Elinor Ostrom’s demonstrates that groups can find
means to manage the environmental problems associated with common pool resources to
avoid the tragedy. (Ostrom 1990) Whether any particular group succeeds depends on the
presence of favorable conditions, making cooperation in any specific setting an empirical
question. The situation with diffuse groups in other environmental policy settings is
analogous. Under favorable conditions they can and do organize and then can influence
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public decision making. When diffuse groups do succeed in effectively organizing, the
most pessimistic predictions of government failure will not be correct.
The common pool resources literature and the literature on social movements
demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that individuals can overcome collective
action problems to pursue environmental objectives and that large, broad-based
environmental groups can organize to achieve collective goals. Does this ability carry
over into the political and regulatory arenas where Stigler and others were so confident
that concentrated economic interests would necessarily dominate? The answer is yes, if
conditions are right. On the one hand, environmental organizations have never been able
to compete with the coalitions and organizations representing industries and commercial
organizations in terms of the financial benefits they can provide for elected officials. On
the other hand, if their numbers are large enough, environmental groups have available to
them effective resources that small groups may lack: votes. Votes are the basic currency
of election or re-election, and so the ability of diffuse groups to marshal a significant
number of votes can be an effective tool for advancing interests in the political arena, and
have the potential to be more effective than the ability to marshal financial resources,
which may not be convertible into that currency. A model developed by Arthur Denzau
and Michael Munger (1986) demonstrates the point. Their model contains three actors,
all of them rational, self-interest maximizers — legislators seeking to maximize reelection votes and who can supply public policy, organized interest groups who have no
votes but can supply campaign resources, and individuals who cannot supply campaign
resources but who do have votes. Denzau and Munger show in straightforward fashion
that if voters are informed about their preferences and the relation of policy proposals to
those preferences, interest groups who can supply campaign resources but not votes do
not influence policy. In later work, Aidt (1998) even shows that when all relevant
interest groups are able to compete for public policy, the result of interest group
competition over environmental policy can be the social welfare maximum, the opposite
of the result predicted by the Stigler model, all the while maintaining the assumption that
politicians are motivated by their narrow self-interest. Aidt’s conditions are not
ordinarily met, but even when they are not, the introduction of the possibility of broadbased group action influencing political behavior generates a much larger range of
possible outcomes, meaning that whether outcomes favor concentrated economic
interests or broad-based interests depends upon the circumstances.
These and other models demonstrate how it is possible for broad based groups to
influence policy. These findings are consistent with the empirical evidence. In
reviewing the history of environmental decision making, “what … seems surprising is the
extent to which environmental advocacy groups have mobilized their constituencies so
effectively,” in seeming contradiction to some interpretations of Olsonian theory. (Oates
and Portney 2003, p. 336) It is impossible to explain the origins of the many stringent
environmental regulations that governments have enacted since 1969 without
incorporating the influence of the preferences of environmentally concerned citizens.
The statutes enacted by the Congress in the period between 1969 and 1975 have their
flaws, but they were serious efforts to reduce environmental externalities and they
imposed significant costs on powerful industries. In an early effort to estimate the costs
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of meeting environmental standards under the laws enacted 1969-75, the Environmental
Protection Agency estimated that the country was then spending about 2.1% of GNP
complying with environmental regulations. (U.S. EPA 1990). Even single policy
initiatives, like the program to reduce acid deposition by reducing sulfur dioxide
emissions from electric utility companies, carried hefty cost estimates. In the acid
deposition case, compliance cost estimates were $4 to $5 billion per year. (Cook and
Miller 1996). Such statutes are not the product of a political process that is being
effectively dominated by the industries subject to these new and costly standards.
Plausible explanations need to incorporate a role for the influence of broad-based
concerns that environmental contaminants be substantially reduced.
Efforts have been made to model situations in which industry itself might
advocate for regulations that imposes costs on itself, but they are not successful in
identifying actual situations in which such advocacy has actually occurred. For instance,
Maloney and McCormick (1982) identify conditions under which imposing
environmental standards on firms can cause profits to go up. The standards must be
imposed in a manner that restricts entry, effectively cartelizing the industry; without this
condition, other firms would see the supra-normal profits and enter, gradually returning
profits to their pre-standards level. They must also not be too strict. To test whether such
profit improvement can actually occur in practice as a result of environmental standards,
Maloney and McCormick examined the effect of OSHA’s cotton dust standards on firm
profits. They found that the stock market traded value of some firms affected by the
standards increased after OSHA’s standards were upheld by the Supreme Court. From
this single instance, they draw the conclusion that “many of the existing laws and
institutions [imposing environmental restrictions] can be explained as devices for
distributing rents created by regulation.” (Maloney and McCormick 1982, p. 121; see
also Stavins 2004, p. 11). This conclusion has two flaws. First, it is a mistake to
extrapolate from a case study to a conclusion about “many” laws and institutions. More
importantly, however, the fact that some firms can benefit in the short-term from
regulations that restrict entry does not explain either the causal mechanisms that produce
such regulations or the purposes for which they were written, and so can hardly be
considered an explanation of them. Environmental regulations nearly always create
winners and losers, but this includes regulations for which broad-based environmental
interests – or, in the case of cotton dust, unions – successfully advocate over the
opposition of industry. Simply demonstrating that some firms gain ex post does not show
that those firms demanded the regulation ex ante. The regulation might have been
written despite, rather than because of, that gain or the gain might have been a co-benefit
of the regulation that was otherwise serving the public interest and not a motivating factor
for it. In the case of cotton dust, the evidence suggests that the industry consistently
opposed OSHA’s restrictions throughout the administrative process and that this
opposition continued afterwards, to the point of the American Textile Manufacturers
Institute and the National Cotton Council of America taking the legal challenge all the
way to the Supreme Court in an attempt to overturn them. Overall, pointing to the
preferences and lobbying efforts of regulated industries “does not seem … very
successful as a positive theory of environmental policy.” (Oates and Portney 2003, p.
330; Moe 1997, pp. 462-63)
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While models that posit regulated firm dominance of the decision making process
do not fare well as general explanations for why stringent environmental laws are
enacted, the situation is somewhat different when focus shifts the choice that legislatures
when selecting the regulatory instruments and procedures to be used to enforce those
laws. The influence of firm preferences is often a useful explanatory variable for these
second-order decisions. For more on this, see Section V(B) below, describing the
literature on instrument choice.
Another approach to explaining the existence of costly environmental regulations
depends on the idea of bootlegger and Baptist coalitions – or “unholy alliances,” in
Ackerman and Hassler’s (1981) terminology -- which unite environmental advocates and
particular sub groups within industry who stand to gain substantially from environmental
regulation, such as waste disposal firms. (Zywicki (2002); Greve and Smith, 1992;
Yandle 1983) In such coalitions, each partner may advocate the same or similar action,
yet each for their own distinct reasons. Coalition explanations of this type diverge from
special interest dominance models because they acknowledge the explanatory value of
including broad-based environmental interests. Oftentimes the “bootlegger” element of
the coalition is a less substantial industry or sub-industry component than the industry
component that stands to lose from the regulation, suggesting that if the contest simply
pitted the two industrial interests against each other, the bootlegger element might well
not prevail. A number of case studies have explored instances in which coalitions of
industry and environmentalists may explain government decisions. Brandt and Svendsen
(2004), for instance, argue that manufacturers of equipment for wind energy, where
European firms dominate, help explain why the EU was willing to commit to the Kyoto
limits on greenhouse gases even after the United States had defected from the agreement.
Earlier Lamm and Yasinow (1969) revealed how the billboard industry combined with
environmental interests in successfully advocating for the Federal Highway
Beautification Act. See also the case studies in Greve and Smith (1992).
Once the possibility that broad-based interests can effectively influence decisions
is incorporated into public choice modeling, a wide range of results becomes possible
when governments are making environmental decisions. The outcome of environmental
policy ceases to be predictably favorable to concentrated economic interests and
unfavorable to broad-based interests, and becomes a process in which different interests
interact, with the balance of influence shifting according to their strength, the institutional
structure of the public choice being made and other factors. The foundational period of
federal environmental policy making in the 1969-1975 period constituted a period in
which mass movement dynamics made environmental interests particularly influential,
with elected officials eager to respond to the broad based clamor for aggressive action to
ameliorate environmental problems. (Bryner 2008, pp. 320-322)
B. Preferences and Motives: The De Gustibus Principle
Recognizing that broad based, diffuse groups can effectively mobilize to
influence policy decisions improves the quality of public choice modeling of

13

environmental policy. But what explains the ability of such groups to overcome
collective action obstacles? In addition to shedding light on a question important in its
own right, the general explanation of how groups of citizens are able to organize also has
implications for a more realistic explanation of the behavior of public officials as well.
Initially, public choice contended that the public interest approach to government
decision making errs by assuming that a different set of assumptions regarding individual
behavior should be used when modeling public decisions than neoclassical economics
successfully uses in modeling private markets. Having expressed skepticism regarding
the assumption that officials will be public-minded, however, the early efforts of public
choice to explain decisions by government actors made the opposite error by assuming
that they never will be. Neither position can be squared with market theory’s approach
toward market actors. Under the de gustibus principle, market theory makes no
assumption about the content of individual preferences, relying instead on revealed
preferences to disclose that information. By not consistently maintaining the de gustibus
principle, early public choice contributions did not live up to their own critique. Satz and
Ferejohn refer to a conception of rationality that imposes no restrictions on substantive
preferences as “thin” to distinguish it from “thick” accounts that do place such
restrictions. (Satz & Ferejohn 1994). Many of the early public choice theories of
government decision making, such a Stigler’s economic theory of regulation, Niskanen’s
theory of bureaucracy, as well as others, are thick accounts: they posit that the relevant
political actors will pursue their material self-interest.
In order to be consistent with market theory’s assumptions, thin rationality
accounts of government decision making appropriately make no a priori assumptions
regarding the preferences of public actors. Instead, they concentrate on revealed
preferences, taking the question of preferences to be an empirical one. Models that
assume preferences are limited to material self-interest can sometimes be helpful as a first
approximation, but whether this is so needs to be verified empirically, not assumed a
priori. Oftentimes, observed behavior shows that people’s preferences are a good deal
more complex. The thick account of rationality has great difficulty explaining the
existence of large group citizen activity that promotes greater environmental quality, for
example. To explain such activity, students of large group collective action of the kind
experienced in such fields as civil rights and the environment typically find three types of
preferences or benefits that individuals may be furthering when they participate in
collective action, only one of which is material. Beyond material benefits, individuals
can obtain both solidary benefits and purposive or expressive benefits from participation
in collective action. (Loomis and Cigler 2007, pp. 9-10) The possibility that these
benefits can flow from collective action implies that broad-based action is possible even
when the positive contribution that any individual can make to achieving material
benefits is small and participation is costly.
The decision to participate in collective action can be modeled as R = pb – c + d,
where R equals the reward from participation, b equals the material benefits that an
individual will gain if the collective action is successful, p equals the probability that the
individual’s participation will be decisive in gaining that collective benefit, c and d equal
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the costs and benefits of participating, respectively. Participation is warranted when R is
positive. Assuming that the only benefits that accrue to an individual are material ones
amounts to setting d equal to zero. Doing so generates the conclusion that large diffuse
groups will seldom be able to organize, because the prospects of pb exceeding c when
individual material benefits are small and the group is large are unlikely. When the dterm – which incorporates solidary and purposive benefits -- is positive, however, then R
can also be positive, and an individual’s choice to participate in large group activity
likewise becomes rationally explicable. (Schroeder 1998) Analysts have identified further
features of collective action situations that can have a significant effect on participation
rates. For instance, the participation decision can be influenced by the amount of trust
individuals have toward others in their group, because trust increases an individual’s
confidence that others will also participate if they do, increasing the value of p. (Lubell
2002).
Incorporating purposive and solidary benefits into the study of large group
behavior has become widely accepted in the literature, although we do not yet have a
thorough understanding of the conditions under which these benefits together with
considerations of trust and other possible influences on the collective action decision
contribute enough to the perceived benefits of participation that they are able to
overcome the costs. Even without having a complete explanation of how groups form
and act effectively, studies regularly find evidence of the influence of such mobilization
on environmental decisions. Hamilton and Viscusi (1999, pp. 145-47), for instance, find
correlations between stricter clean ups at hazardous waste sites and measures of citizen
mobilization such as higher voter turnout and higher per capita membership in
environmental groups. Similarly, Daley (2007) finds that the participation of citizen
advisory groups in the development of clean up standards for hazardous waste sites has a
statistically significant correlation to selection of more health-protective remedies at such
sites. Other studies have found the presence of environmental organizations affects
environmental enforcement activity. (Davis & Davis 1999, Helland 1998c, Hamilton
1996). In a case study, Bernauer and Caduff (2004) test the hypothesis that NGOs can
effectively translate public concerns into regulatory policy, defeating producer or
industrial interests. They document the influence of NGOs in setting European policy
toward the use of growth hormones in meat. (The EU banned growth hormones, over the
objections of local and international beef producers. Subsequently, the World Trade
Organization ruled that the ban was an impermissible trade barrier because it lacked a
sufficient scientific basis.) Applying a times-series regression analysis to United
Nations’ Global Environmental System monitoring data from 1977 to 1988, Binder and
Neumayer (2005) find that the strength of environmental NGOs has a statistically
significant impact on the strength of country controls on sulfur dioxide, smoke and heavy
particulates. They identify a number of causal mechanisms that may explain the
influence of NGOs, including their ability to convince policymakers that their political
support from its members and the larger public will increase as a result of supporting
more protective pollution standards.
The results of individual studies such as these are difficult to generalize. They
neither establish that large groups will regularly be able to overcome collective action
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barriers nor that when they do they will prevail against producer or industrial interests.
They are, however, telling counter-examples against the claim of effective dominance by
producer or industrial interests and they provide ample justification for modeling
environmental policy decisions in ways that incorporate the possibilities that diffuse
groups can organize and, when they do, sometimes prevail against opposing interests.
Thinning out the notion of rationality by admitting the possibility of solidary and
purposive benefits improves the ability of public choice to describe observed behavior,
producing better models that can generate better predictions. Normative or prescriptive
judgments about government’s appropriate role in addressing environmental problems
will then be founded on more reliable estimates of the consequences of assigning various
decisions to government.
If the activity of large-group organizations helps substantiate the impact of
solidary and purposive benefits among citizens, similar non-material benefits may be
accruing to other participants in public decisions in ways that ought not to be ignored. In
fact, modeling of the behavior of elected officials and bureaucrats also improves if the
possibility of their having non-material preferences is acknowledged. In an important
early study, Kalt and Zupan (1984) analyzed the voting patterns of Senators during the
period 1977-78 when twenty-one separate votes on the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act were taken, due to President Ford vetoing the measure twice before
President Carter signed it. Employing an econometric model, they find that including in
the model’s specification the Senator’s “ideology” – their “ideas about how government
can best serve” their “conception of the public interest,” id. p. 281 -- significantly
increased the model’s ability to predict how a Senator will vote. In a study aimed
primarily at determining whether Senators vote to protect their states from the costs of
environmental compliance, Hussain and Laband (2005) examined roll call votes on
environmental legislation from 1991-2002. They found that pro-environment ideology
significantly increased the probability of a pro-environment vote, while the prospect of
the senator’s state being adversely affected relative to other states decreased that
probability. In a study of Senate and House votes on the Superfund legislation, Hird
(1994) tested the influence of member’s ideological commitments to environmental
protection compared to the prospects for returning net financial benefits to their districts
or states. While finding evidence of programmatic pork in Superfund voting behavior, in
both House and Senate voting Hird also found that ideological positions had greater
explanatory power.
More generally, the best models of legislative behavior do not restrict the factors
that influence them to ones that advance a legislator’s material interests. Instead, they
acknowledge “a constellation of factors made possible by being a legislator: making
public policy, doing good things for the country or for the district, satisfying ideological
beliefs, having prestige and the prerequisites of the office and so on.” (Keohane, Revesz
and Stavins 1999, p. 95; see also (Farber & Frickey 1991, p. 33) Contextual features
will determine how an individual legislator can maximize the overall benefits he or she
receives from all of these contributing factors, including such circumstances as the type
of decision being made, its visibility and the distribution of observable costs and benefits.
Sometimes this may mean supplying public policy that narrow economic interests want,
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but at other times it will be achieved by serving one’s constituents or by acting to
advance principled commitments, including commitments to the general welfare.
Studies show that bureaucrats as well as elected officials are influenced by a
larger set of factors than a thick rationality account recognizes. In a multi-variate
econometric study of decisions by the EPA to cancel uses of registered pesticides over
the period 1972-1987, for instance, Maureen Cropper and colleagues found that
cancellation decisions were significantly influenced by balancing health risks against the
economic value of continued use. While this result might be interpreted as the EPA
simply engaging in a trade off between the selfish concerns of different special interest
groups, Cropper and her colleagues found evidence that EPA was performing an informal
cost-benefit analysis of the general kind considered necessary by economists in order to
produce sensible regulations. (Cropper, et al. 1992). The study concluded that “it appears
that EPA is indeed capable of making the kind of balancing decisions that economists
presumably support and that FIFRA clearly requires.” Id. p. 193. While the specific
results may well deviate some from those that market theory’s welfare maximization goal
would recommend, they also suggest that the choices made reflect an appreciation of both
the general welfare gains that reduced exposure to pesticides can achieve as well as the
concerns of producers. Other studies have produced similar results. When Hird (1990)
studied expenditures at Superfund sites, he found that the site’s hazard risk ranking – a
measure of the amount of public health risk associated with the site -- was the most
significant factor influencing site specific spending, with the preferences of legislators
playing a lesser role. Likewise, in a study of decisions made by the Interior Department
on the sale of leases for offshore drilling, Hoagland and Farrow (1996) found of legislator
and interest group priorities influenced outcomes, but so did the expected net social value
of each lease.
Such studies move away from thick accounts of rationality to ones that
accommodate a richer set of arguments in the objective function of public officials. In
doing so, they lose some of the tractability of modeling that come with thick accounts,
because it typically is easier to determine what choice will improve material well being
than it is when using thinner accounts, where assessing the comparative ability of
different choices to advance a more complex menu of influencing factors is more
difficult, especially when some of these influences are intangible and unobservable. One
way that analysts accommodate the greater complexity of the thin rationality assumption
is to employ reduced-form analyses in which a number of different possible influencing
factors can be represented as independent variables in empirical studies of decision
making. The research objective then is to test the significance of each factor, rather than
specifying a formal public choice model. A variety of interesting findings have emerged
from such studies, amply demonstrating that decision makers respond to multiple
influences. In a study of decisions by the Fish and Wildlife Service with respect to
endangered species, Metrick and Weitzman (1996) tested whether agency decisions are
affected by “scientific” characteristics of species, such as empirical evidence of their
threatened or endangered status, or by “visceral” characteristics, such as whether the
species involved are perceived in emotionally favorable ways. They found significant
influence of visceral factors, with decisions favoring visually attractive species, like the
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spotted owl, or familiar mammals, like grizzly bears. They also found that different types
of decisions are differentially influenced by these factors. Scientific considerations seem
to play a heavier role in the initial listing decisions, for instance, than they do in the
decisions about how much money to spend on protective actions, where visceral factors
predominate. They find evidence that conflicts with development projects also have a
bearing on agency outcomes.
Hamilton and Viscusi (1999) analyzed the records of decision at Superfund sites
in order to understand what factors affected decisions regarding the stringency of clean
up at those site. Using voter turnout, membership in environmental organizations and the
environmental advocacy ratings of the state’s senators as proxies for collective action by
concerned citizens, they found “that the likelihood that residents will engage in collective
action does cause regulators to adopt more stringent cleanup standards and spend more to
avert cancer cases.” Id., p. 154. Because more stringent clean up often imposed costs
greater than could be justified by the expected monetary value of the anticipated health
benefits, the influence of citizen collective action seems to push regulators away from
decisions likely to maximize social welfare judged by willingness to pay. Hamilton and
Viscusi also suggest an interesting implication for advocates of environmental justice:
because low income communities tend to be less politically active, decisions that are less
responsive to local community organization and more responsive to formal cost-benefit
analysis may actually improve outcomes from an environmental justice perspective. On
the other hand, Daley’s work, cited earlier, suggests the alternative hypothesis that
greater use of community advocacy groups in low income community may improve the
responsiveness of clean up decisions to their concerns. (Daley 2007).
The interplay of interest group priorities and other preferences of agency officials
can be complex, sometimes due to the number of interest groups reflecting different
priorities that have a stake in an outcome. For instance, Martin et al. (1996) identified
seven distinct interest groups with a stake in oil and gas leasing on federals lands: the oil
company, local organizations representing environmental, tourist, timber, retail and
wholesale concerns, local government and the agency itself. Regulatory actions typically
involve a large number of discrete decisions, and it is plausible that different interest
groups may have greater influence at different points in the process. In a study of the use
of environmental taxes in Europe, for instance, Ekins and Speck (1999) identified a
number of specific exemptions or other forms of tax relief benefiting different sectors of
the economy. Similar targeted benefits, this time in the form of bonus allowances, were
included in the legislation establishing the acid rain control program in the United States.
(Joskow and Schmalensee 1998)
One particular potential influence on agency behavior that has received much
attention is that of the legislature. Here, as is the case with the study of bureaucratic
behavior more generally, principal-agent models have become the standard. (Wood and
Waterman 1994, Davis and Davis 1999) Among the principal concerns here has been to
determine what influences bureaucratic behavior. One possibility is that agencies follow
the decision rules of the statutes under which they operate. Another possible influence
comes from the preferences of current legislators who exercise oversight authority and
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control the size of an agency’s budget through annual appropriations. Presidents, too,
have a strong interest in directing the bureaucracy and likewise have several tools
available to them, primarily the power to appoint agency leadership as well as centralized
oversight through the Office of Management and Budget that all Presidents since Nixon
have exercised. Interest group influence, either indirectly through the legislature or the
President, or directly by providing benefits to agency officials, of course must also be
considered.
Wood and Waterman examined the influence of congressional and presidential
preferences by using a number of different tests to examine how agencies responded to
preference changes in the Congress and the Presidency. Examining different agencies
and political circumstances, they regularly found changes in agency behavior
corresponding to changes in the political branches, suggesting that the one was
responsive to the other. At the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, when Congress
expressed anxiety about nuclear safety by enacting legislation in 1980, enforcement
actions by the agency increased, but they then decreased after President Reagan replaced
President Carter, bringing with him a deregulatory philosophy as well as strong support
for commercial use of nuclear power. (Wood and Waterman 1994, pp. 49-50) During
the same time period during the Reagan administration, inspections and product seizures
at the Food and Drug Administration also declined. Id., pp. 52-57. Similarly, the number
of auto defect engineering inspections at the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration fell early in the Reagan administration, id., pp. 59-61, as did the number
of violation notices issued by the Office of Surface Mining, id. pp. 62-64.
These changes occurred while the Congress, which remained in democratic hands,
was much more pro-enforcement than the President, thus suggesting presidential
dominance. On the other hand, enforcement of the hazardous waste laws increased
during the Reagan administration, when Reagan’s control of the agency was weakened
by scandals involving the EPA administrator, Anne Gorsuch Burford and Rita Lavelle,
the hazardous waste administrator, enabling Congress to gain an upper hand. In a test of
the relative influence of the Congress that enacted legislation compared to the current
Congress, DeShazo and Freeman (2003) looked at the determinants of Fish and Wildlife
Service decisions either listing subspecies or setting the funding allocated to their
recovery. They found the preferences of the members of the appropriations and oversight
committees of the current Congress had statistically significant effects on those decisions,
while the influence of the factors written into the statute was statistically insignificant.
See also Rawls and Laband (2004) Beyond the studies already noted, a number of others
have examined the bureaucratic decisions that are often critical in determining how
statutory standards will actually be applied with respect to Superfund (Gupta, et al.
1996)), toxic substances (Van Houtven and Cropper 1996), the endangered species
program (Simon et al, 1995) and leaking underground storage tanks (Berrens et al. 1999).
The principal-agent framework has been employed by a large and growing
literature examining the determinants of the decisions of agencies implementing
environmental policy. The context-dependent nature of these analyses again prevents
broad generalizations about the comparative role of interest groups and the ideological or
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other non-material preferences of public officials, except to say that an emerging theme
of this work is that both matter. The earlier work that posited dominance of concentrated
economic interests was not wrong to conclude that those interests influenced public
decisions. Its error was in neglecting to consider the significant role played by a much
larger range of interests, including broad-based environmental interests, as well as the
role played by ideological and other non-material preferences.

V. Environmental Federalism and Instrument Choice
This section examines the literature on environmental federalism and regulatory
instrument choice, the last two of the four questions identified at the beginning of the
prior section. Once again, theoretical and empirical contributions as well as normative
implications receive attention.
A. Environmental Federalism
Within the United States, government responses to environmental problems could
occur at the federal, state, regional or local levels, as well as at multi-national or even
global levels. The variation of environmental problems will determine what level or
combination of levels can most sensibly respond; there is no universally correct solution
to how responsibility should be allocated among them. Appropriate and sufficient
responses to global warming require global or at least multi-national responses;
appropriate and sufficient responses to congestion on city streets can often be made by
local or regional government. There is a body of thought within economics generally
advocating that responsibility be assigned to the lowest level of government that still
encompasses the vast preponderance of both the effects of the environmental externalities
and the sources of those externalities. That governmental unit is capable of fully
appreciating the competing costs and benefits associated with the externality, and it can
then balance them by taking into account the preferences of those citizens who are
adversely affected by the externality as well as of those whose activities are producing
the harm. It is straightforward to show that such government responses can produce
greater social benefits than a one-size-fits-all approach established at a higher level of
government, while responses at a lower level of government will fail to internalize all the
relevant costs and benefits. So when the causes and effects of environmental problems
are localized, the preference from the perspective of allocative efficiency is to assign
regulatory responsibility to a local rather than a national level of government.
Many environmental problems are not localized. For just one example, much air
pollution has a spatial reach that extends for hundreds of miles, even around the globe. A
non-negligible amount of the mercury emissions that falls on United States territory can
be traced to Chinese power plants, for instance, and the effect of greenhouse gas
emissions from any locality eventually affects the entire planet. These spillover effects
prevent any local government from being able to encompass the problem, and the
presence of spillovers weakens the case for assigning responsibility to lower levels of
government, out of concern that they will disregard negative spillovers into other
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jurisdictions. Empirical work tends to substantiate this, by showing that states seem to
enforce laws less stringently against firms located near borders with other states.
(Helland and Whitford 2003). Even granting the need for national treatment of
spillovers, however, a common criticism of American environmental policy is that it has
federalized too many environmental decisions, and thereby falls short of achieving the
allocative efficiencies of a more decentralized approach.
Often times, advocates of nationalizing environmental regulation buttress the
spillover-based argument for national standards with one that has even broader
applications. They often argue that even the regulation of local problems – problems that
from an efficiency perspective could to be handled at a lower level of government -ought to be federalized in order to save local jurisdictions from the destructive effects of
a “race to the bottom.” The claim is that when local jurisdictions are left to make
environmental regulatory decisions, the demands on local jurisdictions to compete with
other jurisdictions for capital by offering lax environmental standards will undermine
environmental protections.
The race to the bottom thesis has generated an enormous literature, especially if
one includes the general literature on inter jurisdictional competition that is not limited to
environmental regulatory matters. For reviews, see Oates (2002), Wellisch (2000),
Wilson (1996). Initially, it is worth remarking on the nature of the literature that the
thesis has generated. It might be thought that the excessive federalization of
environmental standards that from an efficiency perspective ought to be handled locally
would be framed as a flagrant instance of government failure, and therefore that it would
produce a body of work developing and testing models to explain why this particular
failure emerges from the self-interest of concentrated economic forces, national
legislators, bureaucrats and other relevant actors. Some work in this rein has been done.
It has been plausibly suggested, for instance, that national industries prefer the economies
of lobbying for and coping with a single standard setter rather than with fifty or more
different state standards. Yandle (1999). Then, too, bootlegger and Baptist explanations
that incorporate the influence of environmental organizations have also been advanced.
On this account, the reasons that environmental organizations prefer national standards
include lower costs of influencing and monitoring federal actions and the greater
membership marketing opportunities associated with the more visible role environmental
organizations play in national rules compared to state or local ones. Farber (1992),
Yandle (1999).
Overall, however, the search for public choice explanations for federalization-asgovernment-failure has played a relatively minor role in the literature compared to
theoretical examinations of whether the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis is itself a plausible
description of how competing states would behave if regulation were left up to them.
Perhaps the reason this question has received so much attention is that until it is resolved,
it cannot be decided whether existing levels of federalization are government failures or
not. If race-to-the-bottom is correct, then assigning regulation to either level of
government would be sub-optimal, and it would be a matter of trying to determine which
deviated more from the welfare-maximizing solution. Consequently, scholars of public
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choice have vigorously debated whether competition among environmental standardsetting jurisdictions produces a race to the bottom, a race to the top, the selection of
welfare-maximizing optimal standards, or something else.
Oates and Schwab have produced the most prominent theoretical model of
competition among local jurisdictions with respect to environmental problems that lack
significant spillover effects. (Oates and Schwab 1988). Their model identifies the
conditions under which local government would establish standards at socially optimal
levels, rather than engaging in a race to the bottom. Individual citizens are assumed to
be both consumers trying to maximize their entire package of goods and services, as well
as workers who provide labor for industry. Capital is assumed to be mobile, while labor
is immobile. Production activity varies with the stringency of the emissions standards,
and production determines labor rates, so allowable emissions are proportional to labor
rates. Oates and Schwab use a median voter model to describe government standard
setting, in which government chooses the standard that maximizes the preferences of the
median voter. Under these conditions, they show that the median voter (who is also the
representative citizen because the population is homogeneous) will prefer a standard that
maximizes the combination of the environmental quality benefits and the wage benefits
she receives, and hence this is the standard that government delivers. Each citizen will
receive the amount of environmental quality that they are willing to pay for via foregone
wages. This is the socially optimal level of regulation. Since Oates and Schwab, models
addressing both domestic and international situations, have proliferated. (Esty and
Geradin 1997; Barrett 1994; Wilson 1996).
Models like Oates and Schwab’s have been relied upon by critics of the
federalization of environmental standards, who infer from them that the worry about
overly lax standards being set by local governments is overdrawn, and hence that the
decisions to federalize local environmental problems is a further instance of government
failure after all. (Revesz 1992, Revesz 2001, Adler 2005b). The conditions required for
the socially optimal result are restrictive, however, similar to those required by Aidt’s
(1998) model for when interest group interactions result in socially optimal regulation.
When they are not met, theory predicts that results will deviate from the ideal. Some
deviations produce regulation that is too lax from an efficiency perspective while others
in regulation that is too strict. As an example of the latter, if citizens exhibit the NIMBY
response to polluting industries, standards are set too high. (Levinson 1999, Glazer
1999). Some scholars consider the NIMBY danger –in which localities enact
environmental standards that are too strict, in order to prevent undesirable facilities from
locating in them – to be at least as great a worry as the race to the bottom. (Adler 2005b).
On the other hand, when political decision makers fear capital flight, lowering
environmental standards can be used as a strategic tool to attract and retain capital, in
which case standards may be set too low. (Oates 2002). Generally, when regulators react
strategically to decision made in other jurisdictions, the results vary according to the
preferences of the actors and their incentives, with no universal result, and empirical
findings in particular settings must be interpreted carefully.
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The empirical literature on the race-to-the-bottom issue is thinner than the
theoretical literature, although it is growing. Before looking at it, however, several
features of the theoretical debate are worth noting. When skeptics of the race to the
bottom hypothesis rely on model like those of Oates and Schwab, they are relying upon a
prediction of local government being relatively successful compared to higher levels of
government. Describing a world in which some governments can succeed while others
fail is a remarkably more nuanced picture than the bleak one generated by the early
interest group models. In fact, the respective approaches to modeling could not differ
more. Instead of assuming the dominance of economically powerful interest groups as in
an interest group model, median voter models of the kind employed by Oates and
Schwab assume that government is responsive to the preferences of the general
population. Under the Oates and Schwab model, for instance, a local government reaches
a welfare-maximizing decision because the median voter prefers a policy where the
marginal monetary benefits she gains from increased environmental quality and increased
wages are equal, and that translates to the socially optimal result.
It also follows from the Oates and Schwab model that if the median voter prefers
economic growth to improved environmental quality, government will adopt lower
standards, and visa versa. In other words, government is responsive to majority
preferences, as democratic theory urges that it ought to be. (Oates and Schwab 1988, pp.
345-349). At the same time, either of those results – higher or lower standards than is
socially optimal from a willingness to pay perspective -- would deviate from the
allocatively efficient outcome, which would seem to mean that from the public choice
perspective each would be an instance of government failure. That is an odd conclusion
to reach regarding decisions that reflect majority preferences. As such, the conclusion
ought to warn of a problem with the standard public choice conception of government
failure that can go unnoticed: even though public choice seeks to explain how
government makes decisions by translating preferences into outcomes, its normative
baseline exists completely independently of whether it corresponds to anyone’s
preferences. Many normative accounts of democracy, on the other hand, place great
weight on whether outcomes are responsive to majority preferences. Of course, majority
decisions are not immune from criticism on normative grounds, and as a constitutional
democracy the United States is committed on placing limits on unfettered
majoritarianism. At the same, within a broad range of policy making discretion,
decisions that reflect the will of the majority possess an enormously powerful democratic
pedigree, and are hardly considered instances of government failure simply because they
are not welfare-maximizing. Public choice theory fails to distinguish between decisions
diverging from a social welfare maximum, based on willingness to pay, that are due to
special interest group influence versus those due to a majority’s preference for some
other choice. This may well be a reason to be somewhat skeptical of public choice’s
definition of government failure.
Even decisions that diverge from both the majority will and the welfaremaximizing result cannot be automatically written off as government failures. Majority
will can be driven by passions and prejudices, as well as by rational ignorance. One of
the most challenging tasks of elected representatives is to mediate the gap that can exist
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between what is perceived to be majority will and the representative’s own understanding
of what is best for the country. Resolving the tension between the two raises the classic
Burkean dilemma, requiring an act of judgment on the part of each representative, one
that not infrequently results in a decision embodying neither a complete endorsement of
the perceived majority will nor a complete expression of the representative’s individual
commitments. The resulting government decisions can thus end up deviating both from
the popular will of the moment and from the outcome that the representative thinks to be
best public decision. Such a result, however, may well the just the kind of compromise
that democracies often end up making, and that are thought essential to responsible
governing.
Lastly, another complexity is added by the fact that there is no justification within
the premises of public choice theory itself to insist that either citizens or their
representatives adopt welfare-maximization as the sole legitimate objective for public
decisions to pursue. Once the thick rationality view of material self-interest is dropped
in favor of a thin rationality account consistent with the de gustibus principle, public
choice’s agnosticism toward individual preferences should extend to individual
preferences about public decisions and values as well as their preferences about private
ones. Accordingly, public choice cannot deny the possibility of individuals preferring
their government to pursue multiple goals, of which welfare-maximization may be just
one. After all, market theorists do not deny that society can legitimately pursue
distributional goals, or justice-related ones, or others. Their preference for reserving
market regulatory measures to those that improve efficiency and for using other
mechanisms to pursue other objectives is a preference that is itself rooted based on an
efficiency concern. Individuals whose value system ranks values differently will be
inclined to approach regulatory decisions differently, giving greater priority to other
values.
For these and other reasons, the relationship between decisions that diverge from
welfare-maximization on the one hand and government failure on the other much more
fraught with ambiguity than public choice regularly acknowledges. The case of local
government following the preferences of the median voter by adopting a welfaremaximizing environmental standard is a relatively easy one to see as a government
success story, and the case of government following the materially self-interested
preferences of a narrow industrial sector to reach a result that is heavily welfare-reducing
is an easy one to condemn. Ceteris paribus, the first combines the attractive features of
both majority responsiveness and a certain substantive appeal while the second is doubly
unattractive. When cases do not fit these extremes, however, the judgment will be more
contestable. Decisions may be only partially responsive to majority will and they may be
subject to criticism on some substantive grounds while praiseworthy on others. The fact
that a particular decision diverges from the single-minded goal of welfare-maximization
seems insufficient by itself to put it automatically in the same category as the welfarereducing, special-interest benefiting decision. The divergence might reflect a difference
of opinion about the goals of government and how to prioritize them when they conflict,
or a compromise between majority responsiveness and principled commitment.
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As an illustration of how various legitimate considerations can affect
environmental decision making, consider the environmental federalism question itself.
Assigning government decisions to the lower rather than higher levels of government can
be defended for reasons quite independent of comparative abilities to make welfaremaximizing decisions. The principle of subsidiarity in the European Union, for instance,
establishes a presumption of decentralization in order to recognize the significant
autonomy of member states. Subsidiarity permits member countries to enact laws that
take into account their own cultural norms, legal traditions and other social factors
distinctive to individual countries. Whether or not subsidiarity is welfare-maximizing, a
separate case can be made for the principle on these grounds. Therefore, even if race-tothe-bottom problems could be convincingly shown, the conclusion that continuing to
abide by the principle of subsidiarity constitutes government failure would surely be
contestable. It might be the case that the competing values of maximizing welfare and
maintaining local autonomy had been appropriately balanced by a responsible
government.
In sum, government decisions can be evaluated for their welfare enhancing
properties and criticized when they fall short. As the discipline of public choice becomes
more consistent with its own fundamental premises, however, it becomes increasingly
problematic to affix the label of government failure solely on that basis. Empirical
results in public choice confirm a more nuanced description of the preferences that go
into public decisions, finding that the relevant actors are frequently influenced by a mix
of motives, including but not limited to the general welfare measured by willingness to
pay. Decisions may often not correspond precisely to what the single minded pursuit of
welfare-maximization would recommend, but if these decisions reflect other values that
members of society hold, and if those values cannot be rejected on normative grounds,
then they are not appropriately labeled government failures for that reason alone. In this
respect, public choice’s normative implications have evolved at the same time as its
descriptive methods have.
What do the empirical results say about the race to the bottom? The empirical
studies are less numerous than the elaborate theoretical debate, and no clear pattern has
emerged. Overall, however, the evidence of races to the bottom is not compelling. Engel
(1997) and Saleska and Engel (1998) surveyed state regulators and concluded that
regulators were generally aware of the standards set by other jurisdictions. They also
examined whether standards were lower when regulators reported that they were
concerned about businesses leaving the jurisdiction, and found that they were. Relying
on other studies suggesting that environmental standards do not generally influence
location decisions by industry, they concluded that lowering standards to keep industry
when it was not going to move in any event was evidence of unnecessarily lax local
standard setting. Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) similarly found evidence that state
regulators are aware of the regulatory standards of other jurisdictions. Using industryadjusted data on relative state environmental abatement costs and unadjusted pollution
and control expenditures per dollar of manufacturing per state – two measures of the
stringency of environmental regulations – they found a positive correlation between
stringency of one state’s standards and those of its neighboring states, suggesting that
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individual regulators make changes to match what their neighbors are doing. As they
note, however, strategic interaction need not be destructive; it could be an indication of
healthy competition. In this case, they find that “states are responsive to abatement cost
changes in neighboring states with initially more stringent environmental policy, but we
detect no significant impact of changes in neighbors with lower abatement costs. …
[T]his implies that states are being ‘pulled’ toward higher abatement costs by
improvements in neighbors with already higher abatement costs.” Id., pp 103-4.
Several papers examine the effect of the devolution of authority under President
Reagan. (List and Gerking 2000, Millimet 2003). The stringency of environmental
standards is a combined function of the standards, how the standards are implemented by
an administrative agency and how they are subsequently enforced. By giving states
greater autonomy to implement and enforce national standards, President Reagan’s
devolution policy provided an opportunity for states to compete with each other for
capital. Using pollution and abatement control expenditures, both per capita and per unit
of manufacturing output, as well as nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide emissions as
measures of effective environmental standard stringency, Millimet (2003) examined the
years 1929-1994. First, Millimet found that the Reagan year trends were distinguishable
from both the preceding and following periods. However, whereas per capita nitrogen
oxide and sulfur dioxide emissions levels deteriorated in the period preceding the Reagan
presidency, during his presidency this trend was reversed. With respect to pollution and
abatement expenditures, Reagan devolution had no discernible effect in the first term,
when states were under severe fiscal constraints. In the late 1980s, however, Millimet’s
findings continue not to support a race to the bottom, and indicate increasing stringency
of environmental standards. List and Gerking’s results were similar. (List and Gerking
2000).
Taking a different approach, Revesz (2001) surveyed the period prior to the
extensive federalization of environmental standards. He found evidence that state
standards increased in stringency in a number of different areas, and that states have
occasionally continued to take action beyond the federal standards even after much
environmental regulation has been federalized. In another approach to the question, Paul
(1994) finds that centralization has not tightened packaging-waste regulation in the EU,
perhaps due to effective lobbying by industry at the EU level.
The hypothesis that states will race to the bottom rests several underlying
assumptions. First, industry makes locational decisions based on the stringency of
environmental standards. Second, states understand this and react strategically to
encourage industry to remain or locate in-state. State strategies will be determined not so
much by absolute levels of their standards but by comparing their states to those of other
states. We have already discussed some research results indicating that states do take the
standards that their neighbors are setting into account. Other studies have examined the
issue of industrial location decisions and whether they are influenced by environmental
standards.
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The results are not consistent. In a study of plant location decisions, McConnell
and Schwab (1990) found environmental standards had little influence. Tobey (1990)
also found no impact across different countries. When Jaffe, et. al (1995), p. 157,
surveyed the entire body of work on this subject, they found little evidence to support the
claim that stringent environmental regulations have an adverse impact on industrial
locations. Other work, however, has found identifiable effects of environmental
regulations on plant location decisions. Henderson (1996) compared plant decisions to
locate in attainment areas for ozone versus non-attainment areas for ozone, where
regulatory standards are stricter, and found a decided preference for the attainment areas.
List et al. (2003) analyzed the decisions of foreign multinational corporations and found
that these companies took the stringency of air quality standards into account in making
location decisions. Looking at these and other studies, Jeppesen et al. (2002) performed a
meta-analysis of the results. They found that the locational effects on foreign companies
were greater than on domestic ones. They also found a division in the research, with
earlier studies finding smaller effects than later ones. While they could identify
methodological differences in the two waves of research, they could not isolate within
them reasons for the differences between them, ultimately concluding that why the
discrepancy “occurs is not entirely clear.” Id. at 24.

B. Instrument Choice
Regulators approach environmental problems with an extensive tool kit. They
can establish performance standards for pollution sources based on the capabilities of
abatement technology, or they can set standards for permissible concentrations of
pollutants in the air, ground or water, for which there are then a variety of ways to
develop individual source standards so that aggregate emissions will meet the ambient
standards, or they can define a level of adverse health effects that is not to be exceeded,
again with a variety of methods for assigning individual responsibilities for controlling
the pollution associated with those health effects. Where the standards set numerical
limits, the legislature can establish them itself, as the Congress does in the case of auto
emissions, or it can delegate that responsibility to an agency, as in the case of ambient air
standards, either with or without deadlines for action, and with or without default
standards that automatically take effect if the agency fails to act. The legislature can
instruct the agency to employ a cost-benefit test for any regulation, either as a check
against performance, ambient or health standards being too stringent or as a direct
standard setting methodology. Notwithstanding the diversity of tools available – and this
summary only touches on some of the variations available – public choice lumps nearly
all of them under the single label of “command-and-control” to signal their differentiation
from market correcting or market-based instruments, and perhaps also in the hope that the
comparison will invoke unhappy memories of failed attempts by government to
implement planned economies. Here we will refer to the first group as direct regulatory
instruments and the second as incentive-based instruments.
Incentive-based instruments also come in different forms, but among the most
frequently discussed are variant of tax measures on the one hand and tradeable permits on
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the other, the former building on the work of Pigou (1920) and the latter on the work of
Dales (1968). Taxes or fees are “price” instruments. They set the price and let market
forces determine the quantity of emissions resulting from that price. Tradeable permits
are “quantity” instruments. They set the total quantity of allowable emissions and permit
the trading market to determine the price. Neither approach is necessarily welfaremaximizing. To be welfare-maximizing, emissions must settle at the level where the
marginal costs of further abatement equals its marginal benefits. Regulators, however,
typically lack the information to identify that point, and they may not be aiming for it in
any event. Still, economists argue that incentive-based instruments are superior to direct
regulatory instruments because in theory they are the most cost-effective way to achieve
whatever result is desired, by virtue of the fact that they create incentives for the
regulated community to minimize the costs of pollution reduction.
Whatever the ultimate amount of reduction in environmental stressors is being
sought, incentive-based regulatory instruments promise to achieve that objective at the
smallest social cost. Early on, market theorists interested in environmental problems
developed a rich literature building on the seminal work of Pigou, Dales and others
designing tax, fee or tradeable permit systems for an enormous range of environmental
problems. From the very beginning of the modern environmental era that has seen so
much government involvement in problems of the environment, those theorists have
advocated incentive-based instruments for their cost-effectiveness property. Government
decision makers have been aware of these recommendations for some time. In the late
1960s and 1970s, for instance, President Nixon seriously considered employing a carbon
tax as a central tool in air quality regulation. And yet decision makers often did not pull
incentive-based instruments from their regulatory tool kit, preferring instead one of the
direct regulatory options.
This mismatch between what markets theorists were recommending and what
governments preferred constitutes the oldest puzzle in public choice’s engagement with
environmental policy making. Buchanan and Tullock (1975) offered the earliest public
choice explanation of the preference for direct regulation over taxes. They argued that
businesses prefer direct regulation to taxes because the direct regulation of emissions
functions as a barrier to entry, giving firms the potential for increased profits that come
from cartelization. This is especially true if the direct regulations impose tighter
regulations on new sources than on existing ones. Direct regulation will frequently be
less expensive for firms because a tax attaches to every unit of pollution emitted, even
after cost-justified abatement technology has been installed, whereas under direct
regulation, in contrast firms pay only for abatement control technology. Therefore, firms
prefer command-and-control over taxes. Dewees (1983) subsequently refined the
Buchanan and Tullock analysis by specifying how firm preferences may change from one
set of circumstances to another.
Other work has extended the study of firm preferences. Tradeable permits of any
kind are thought to be less preferred than direct regulation because their costs are similar
to taxes. In addition, firms prefer price certainty with respect to their inputs, and
tradeable permits have the further disadvantage of being price uncertain. Within the class
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of tradeable permits, however, the method of distributing allowances matters at great deal
to firms. If allowances are distributed without charge based on historical data, such as
historical emissions levels, often called grandfathering, this serves as an entry barrier for
new firms while also existing firms to the extent they can sell excess allowances. For a
review of possible firm preferences, see Keohane, Revesz and Stavins (1999), pp. 104107.
Buchanan and Tullock’s model of government is similar to Stigler’s in that firm
preferences are the only ones considered, and government is simply assumed to provide
what firms want. When we examined the question of why governments would tackle
environmental problems by imposing costly measures on firms at all, we saw that such
firm-dominance models did not square with the observed facts. With respect to
instrument choice, however, firm-dominance models have a great initial plausibility,
because their predictions are generally more consistent with our observations: direct
regulation is widespread, emissions taxes are relatively rare and when tradeable permits
have been employed they almost always have relied upon a grandfathering scheme for
distribution of all or nearly all of the available allowances. Nonetheless, we know from
the earlier discussion that many government decisions are not dominated by narrow
economic interests. Environmentally minded individuals can and do organize effectively
and individuals including elected officials have preferences extending beyond their own
material self-interest, among them being commitments to public values, including
promoting the general welfare. So the treatment of instrument choice ought not simply to
ignore the possibilities that these influences may be at play here as well.
More recent contributions to the public choice analysis of instrument choice
incorporate the preferences of environmental organizations, legislatures and bureaucrats.
The more complex picture that emerges describes the preferences of these other
participants as often congruent or substantially overlapping those of industry, particularly
with respect to the preference for direct regulation. If groups that on other issues may
oppose one another happen to agree on some basic choices with regard to instruments,
then the extensive use of those instruments may not be a signal of effective dominance of
any single constituency. In this regard, environmental organizations are thought to have
a number of their own reasons to prefer direct regulation. These include the
philosophical or ethical objection that pollution taxes and tradeable permits constitute
“licenses to pollute,” the concern that taxes and permitting systems may be difficult to
change in light of new evidence of pollution damage and the concern for toxic hot spots
that certain incentive-based instruments may produce. In addition, some environmental
organizations historically have been dominated by lawyers rather than economists, and so
are less familiar with incentive-based instruments. That legal-training bias may be shared
by legislators and their staffs, who are also much more likely to be lawyers than
economists. As or more important, taxes are politically difficult for legislatures to
support, and the visibility of the costs to consumers of taxes on polluting activities may
be greater, and hence less attractive to politicians, than the more hidden costs of direct
regulation. Direct regulation may also provide elected officials greater opportunities to
influence important implementation decisions. Agencies may prefer direct regulation
instruments because of their familiarity, and because such approaches require larger
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administrative staff than incentive-based instruments do. For a review of the possible
preferences of environmental groups, legislators and bureaucrats with regard to
instrument choice, see Keohane, Revesz and Stavins (1999), pp. 107-113.
These hypotheses about the preferences of various constituents require
verification, of course, and few empirical studies of them are available. Even casual
observation indicates that they are at best generalizations with exceptions. For instance,
one major environmental organization, the Environmental Defense Fund, has been a long
standing advocate of incentive-based instruments. In 1989-1990, its support of the
tradeable permit program through which the acid rain program was implemented was
significant at the time for breaking with other environmental organizations, and the
organization has continued to advocate incentive-based measures. EDF has always had a
good number of economists on its staff, which may help explain its different view. In
addition, this advocacy may help differentiate it from other organizations, giving it
advantages in a niche of environmental advocacy that is useful in fund-raising.
Empirical studies of instrument choice are sparse. In one relevant study,
Hamilton (1997) draws an important distinction between voting on the final bill for
passage and preliminary votes on subsidiary issues such as instrument choice. He
examines a series of votes on the 1985 Superfund amendments. These involved votes on
a number of instrument choices, including a provision mandating disclosure of
information, a tax on chemical and petroleum industries and a provision establishing
liability for personal injury. Hamilton finds that broad constituent preferences and
member ideology had greater effect on the more visible vote for final passage, while the
influence of concentrated economic interests was greater on the less visible votes on the
subsidiary issues. In a similar vein, Joskow and Schmalensee (1998) examine how some
of the less visible details of allocating initial allowances under the acid rain program were
significantly influenced by the preferences of special interests. Ackerman and Hassler’s
(1981) study of standard setting for coal-burning power plants, a rich case study, further
illustrates one lesson that comes from the close study of instrument choice: the devil is in
the details. Whereas a preference analysis of a generic policy instrument might predict
opposition from a particular constituency, the details of the measure may turn opposition
into support, and vice versa.
Just as the support of a firm with stable preferences for a regulatory instrument
may vary according to the details of how the instrument is designed, it may be that firm
evaluations of the same instrument may change over time in ways that affect support.
This may be part of the explanation for why governments are selecting incentive-based
instruments with increasing frequency. Economists still think there are fewer such
instruments in place than ideal, and find that the ones that have been enacted often have
cost-effectiveness-impairing defects. (Hahn 1989, Stavins 2003). Nonetheless, the list of
existing incentive-based programs has been growing steadily, and is now fairly
impressive. (Stavins 2003). Just as important, when governments consider costly new
regulations, incentive-based measures are increasingly the approach of choice. In the
United States, the Environmental Protection Agency has been an especially strong
advocate of tradeable permit schemes, even before the successful acid rain program was
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enacted in 1990, and continuing to this day. Since 1990, all the major programs that EPA
has implemented to address interstate air pollution problems have included a cap-andtrade permit program. Similarly, it seems inevitable that the nation’s approach to
reducing greenhouse gases will include an incentive-based program. While the current
overwhelming favorite in current legislative proposals is a cap-and-trade program, in
January, 2009, Rex Tillerson, the CEO of Exxon Mobil, publicly endorsed a tax on
carbon, with an initial rate “somewhere north” of $20/ton, which is about the price that
carbon allowances are trading for in the EU’s cap-and-trade program for greenhouse
gases. (Stilson 2009)
The conviction that regulation firms prefer direct regulation over incentive-based
instruments have long been a staple in the public choice analysis of instrument choice. If
those preferences are now shifting, then the public choice analysis of instrument choice
needs to be substantially rethought. This is an area that would benefit greatly from
additional research. Suggested explanations include greater familiarity with such
instruments; increased pollution reduction costs, which puts pressure on parties to seek
cost-effective measures; and a general political shift toward a trust in markets. (Keohane,
Revesz and Stavins 1997, p. 45) All of these fall short of fully explaining support by a
major oil company for the specific instrument of a tax instead of a cap-and-trade program
with some grandfathering of initial allocation of allowances. That support is a long way
from Buchanan and Tullock’s initial prediction.
VI. Conclusion
This review began by outlining some of the interconnections and commonalities
between market theory’s study of environmental problems and public choice’s study of
environmental policies. While the parallelism between the two remains imperfect, the
developments in public choice reviewed here have served to bring the two enterprises
closer together. The shift from thick rationality to thin rationality assumptions about the
behavior of voters, legislators and bureaucrats better aligns public choice’s behavioral
assumptions with those that market theory applies to market actors. Acknowledging the
possibility that political actors can be motivated by the prospect of solidary or purposive
benefits and by principled commitments in addition to material self interest also
complicates the analysis. Simpler models that assume material self-interest drives all
relevant actors have the virtue of permitting more definitive predictions, but they also
suffer from the greater vices of not squaring with the observed facts about the actors they
seek to model and, consequently, of producing poor predictions. Once the stricter
assumption of thick rationality is relaxed, the relative influence of potentially competing
benefits needs to be assessed, and this must be done without the benefit of a
comprehensive theory to explain their respective roles. The question has been shown to
be an empirical one, leading to increasing use of reduced-form analyses that study
revealed preferences. Until the empirical data becomes more robust, generalizations
from specific results must be made with caution. Environmental policy making, with its
multiple decisions and decision making institutions, will continue to provide a fertile
ground for the discipline’s empirical work.
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Even cautiously interpreted, however, the body of empirical work confirms that
the more benign predictions of government behavior that thin rationality models generate
are often times more reliable than the grim results of the simpler models. Self-interest
and self-dealing have clearly not been disproven as powerful motivators, but at the same
time the research shows that the influence of broad-based interests and ideological
commitments can be effective. The possibility that government can work better than the
grim theory predicts should prompt a greater research emphasis going forward on
identifying institutional design features within public decision making structures that
increase the odds for better public decisions. That emphasis would make the parallelism
between public choice and market theory still stronger. Market theory has developed a
well analyzed toolkit of instruments designed to correct for different market failures,
including the externalities that typify most major environmental issues. Market theory
proposes taxes, subsidies, markets for pollution allowances and better defined property
rights as measures that can internalize externalities. The analogous public choice
literature, while growing, remains more rudimentary and fragmented. This relative lack
of development may be partially attributable to the stress that the grim branch of the
public choice literature has placed on abandoning government, rather than on improving
it. Nonetheless, public choice as a field of inquiry has always contended that institutions
matter, as evidenced by its extensive study of voting, chamber-committee structures and
veto gates. Once the possibility of government producing decisions that advance the
public interest has been acknowledged, the interest in how differently constituted
institutions can transform the same preferences of actors into different outcomes should
be convertible into an increasingly robust literature on methods for addressing various
types of government failure.
This work will have to proceed incrementally, because a comprehensive theory
of public environmental policy decision making would require combining a number of
distinct components, each complex in their own right and each at this point incomplete.
Such a comprehensive theory would provide an account of how the preferences of voters
and constituents influence legislator’s behavior; how the preferences of legislators,
mediated by legislative rules and structure, influence agency behavior and how agency
preferences, mediated by administrative rules and agency structure, legislative oversight,
direction by the President and judicial review, produce regulatory outcomes that in turn
influence the private behaviors that proximately cause most environmental problems.
Lack of a comprehensive theory need not discourage research on each of its constituent
parts; in fact, should a comprehensive theory develop, it will undoubtedly be as a result
of prior success on individual parts. Already, the principal-agent theory that forms the
dominant research paradigm for several of these parts has worked on a number of
important questions of institutional design, with more work, both theoretical and
empirical remaining to be done. Within the principal-agent relationship between
legislature and agency, for instance, the question remains open whether Congress’
structuring of administrative rules and procedures serves to increase legislative control of
agency outcomes to increase agency autonomy or to achieve some mix of the two.
(McCubbins, Noll, Weingast 1987, 1989; Bawn, 1995; Croley, 2008) There are both
theoretical and empirical questions here. Typically, principal-agent theory examines how
to maximize control of the agent by the principal, subject to constraints of asymmetric
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information, monitoring costs and operational efficiency. In the context of legislative
control of agencies, however, maximum control may not be theoretically desirable.
Instead, a certain degree of agency autonomy may be preferable if that promotes
decisions that are more technically sound; presumably, taking advantage of the greater
technical expertise that agency’s can acquire constitutes a significant reason for
delegating to them. Should autonomous agencies also be better equipped to engage in the
reasoned decision making to which theories of deliberative democracy give priority, as
some have argued (Seidenfeld, 1992; Croley, 2008), greater agency autonomy may be
further supported.
In the empirical realm, studies attempting to understand how specific features of
institutional design influence agency behavior can usefully proceed independently of
such theoretical debates, because improved instrumental understanding of how design
affects outcomes can inform how to implement any normative theory.
Existing
environmental studies give rise to some suggestions worthy of further exploration.
Agencies directing Superfund clean up, for instance, seem more responsive to the
priorities of local communities when those communities are politically active (Hamilton
and Viscusi 1999). Providing assistance to local communities so that they may
participate in complex regulatory determinations also has statistically significant
consequences for those determinations. (Daley 2007). On the other hand, less visible
decisions seem more susceptible to influence by concentrated special interests, whether
those decisions take place in the legislative chamber, in the form of votes on less visible
amendments to bills before final passage (Hamilton 1997), or in administrative agencies,
as in funding decisions for habitat protection, which are less visible than the initial listing
decisions. (Metrick and Weitzman 1996; see also DeShazo and Freeman 2003). Noticeand-comment procedures have been studied to assess whether they provide an avenue for
expanding the influence of broad-based interests in agency decision making, with mixed
findings. Cropper et. al. (1992: 195) found that environmental interests were able to
participate “quite effectively” in pesticide rulemaking. Magat, Krupnick and Harrington
(1986), on the other hand, found that business comments submitted to EPA had little
discernible influence on final effluent guidelines issued under the Clean Water Act,
suggesting that notice-and-comment at least does not augment the influence of
concentrated economic interests. Results similar to Magat et al. are reported by Golden
(1998) and Nixon, Howard and DeWitt (2002) for non-environmental rules. In contrast,
in a study of 40 non-environmental rules issued between 1994-2001, Yackee and Yackee
(2006: 136) found that “business influence is enhanced when there are a high proportion
of business comments submitted during the public comment period.” These seemingly
disparate findings could be consistent with the studies noted earlier in this paragraph that
point out a difference between high and low visibility rules, because Yackee and
Yackee’s study “focus[es] on the low salience rulemakings that dominate most agencies’
regulatory agendas.” (Id., 137). Croley’s (2008) study of some high-visibility rules lends
further support to the supposition that broad-based interests fare better in more highly
mobilized environmental decision. In detailed cases studies of the EPA’s 1997 rules
tightening the air quality standards for ozone and particulate matter, the FDA’s 1996 rule
regulating tobacco, and the Forest Service’s 2001 “roadless rule” – all of them extremely
high visibility, controversial rules that stimulated enormous volumes of notice and
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comment – Croley finds in each that broad-based interests were advanced in the final
rules, notwithstanding the concerted and organized opposition of highly organized
economic forces arrayed against them, with no significant weakening of the rules
emerging from the notice-and-comment process (id. 178, 195, 212). In each case, Croley
concludes that participation by the diffuse beneficiaries strengthened the agencies’
resistance to pressures to weaken the protections provided by the respective rules.
A major reason that public choice research on environmental policy making has
evolved in the past forty years can be traced to the wave of significant environmental
legislation enacted in the late 1960s and early 1970s to address problems of conventional
pollutants, which could not be squared with the grim predictions of early contributions to
the field. Currently, environmental policy making debates are dominated by the
unresolved issues of global warming and climate change; it may well be that these issues
will stimulate further public choice refinements. For one thing, the recent support by
Exxon Mobil’s CEO of a tax on carbon in excess of $20/ton runs directly counter to the
conventional wisdom on industrial preferences for regulatory instruments. The
conventional wisdom insists that companies like Exxon Mobil will generally prefer direct
regulatory controls over incentive based measures, and, if the possibilities are limited just
to incentive-based measures, they will prefer markets with grandfathered allocations of
allowances over auctioned allowances. In all cases, Pigouvian taxes are the least
preferred option. If Tillerson’s endorsement of a tax is more than cheap talk, it ought to
stimulate a re-analysis of firm preferences for instrument choice. Perhaps at some point
the price certainty of a tax becomes preferable to the alternatives. Identifying the
conditions under which a firm would prefer a tax – which is often market theory’s most
preferred regulatory option – ought to be an important area for further exploration. More
generally, Spence (2001) suggests that public choice may need to reconsider its
assumptions about the preferences of firms at a basic level. He argues that contemporary
firms are incorporating environmental responsibility into their preferences.
Even putting aside Exxon Mobil’s support of a tax, the global warming debate
domestically and throughout the world takes it as a foregone conclusion that some from
of incentive-based instrument will be employed in both domestic legislation and
international agreements – and in the United States, momentum is strongly tending
toward carbon dioxide markets that auction a considerable percentage of allowances
rather than grandfathering existing sources. Years ago, Stigler derided those who sought
to effect regulatory improvements by “preaching” the virtues of market-based
mechanisms. Is it possible that forty more years of preaching has actually re-shaped
policy debate so that such mechanisms have become the default choice among both
legislators and agencies? If so, public choice research may have to become yet more
sensitive to the potential for ideological or principled commitments to shape regulatory
outcomes.
Studying the role of broad-based support for innovative environmental policies
in climate change policy may also stimulate further refinements in public choice. So far,
most opinion polling indicates that the public has become convinced that climate change
is occurring and that greenhouse gases from human sources are contributing substantially
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to the phenomenon. The support for strong corrective measures, however, is quite thin,
and not much changed from polls taken twenty years ago. (Schroeder, forthcoming) It
will be well worth watching whether public support strengthens as the policy debate
proceeds. If it does, public choice research can be helpful in studying the conditions
under which that strengthening occurs, thereby contributing to our still rudimentary
knowledge of how social movements successfully mobilize. In watching whether broadbased support contributes to passage of a bill, public choice can also bear in mind that
numerous preliminary decisions on questions of regulatory design and detail will have to
be resolved prior to enactment. Existing research strongly suggests that the influence of
concentrated economic interests will be at its height with respect to these less visible
decisions, rather than on final passage. Careful study of how these less visible decisions
are made and what seems to be most influential in them can also contribute significantly
to the existing work.
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